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Abstract 
 
Theoretical banking literature has largely explored the role of financial intermediaries in the 
economy, market failures (banking panics) in the banking sector and the need for bank 
regulation. However, most models of banking panics and regulation have not been empirically 
tested. 
The Argentine 2001 crisis, with a large deposit withdrawal and the regulation introduced 
(suspension of convertibility) constitutes a scenario in order to apply some of the theoretical 
predictions. 
In particular, the paper applies Samartín (2002) to the particular case of Argentina. After the 
estimation of the most important parameters, the model predicts that suspension of 
convertibility seems to have been the most efficient intervention measure to stop the massive 
deposit withdrawals. 
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1 Introduction
The financial system has traditionally been vulnerable to the problem of bank
runs, in which many or all depositors at a bank attempt to withdraw their
funds simultaneously. If these withdrawals at a particular bank then spread
to many or all banks in the banking system they generate a banking panic,
with important consequences on both the financial and the real sector of the
economy.1
In the 1980s and 1990s several countries experienced banking panics or pe-
riods in which their banking systems stopped functioning and these economies
evidenced important real effects.2 More recently, at the end of 2001, Argentina
experienced a banking panic, which resulted in one of the most important fi-
nancial crisis in its history.
Given the relevance of these recent phenomena, the adequate regulatory
design of the financial system has become again an important topic of discussion
among politicians, regulators and academics.
From a theoretical perspective, the literature has focused on analyzing the
rationale behind the existence of financial intermediaries, the causes of banking
panics and the different regulatory measures in order to prevent them (a com-
prehensive survey of this literature can be found in Gorton and Winton, [2002]).
However, none of these papers has been empirically tested.
The main features of the Argentine crisis, allow us to empirically apply one
of the models developed in the theoretical literature. In particular, this paper
will try to analyze if the regulatory measure which was implemented (suspension
of convertibility, or also know as corralito) has been an efficient tool in order to
prevent banking panics.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 gives a brief overview of the
economic and regulatory situation in Argentina and a description of the crisis
in 2001. Section 3 is devoted to discuss two measures that have traditionally
been used by banks in order to prevent panics: suspension of convertibility and
deposit insurance. A welfare comparison of the above measures, in the case of
Argentina, is carried out in section 4. Finally, concluding remarks are presented
in section 5.
1One example of such crises is the Great Depression (1929-1933), which had a significant
impact on the banking system of the US, where more than one third of the banks failed (see
Gorton and Winton, [2002]).
2Lindgren, Garcia and Saal [1996] find that 73 per cent of the IMFs member countries
suffered banking crises between 1980 and 1996.
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2 The 2001 Argentine crisis
Argentina is no exception to the financial crises suffered by several developing
countries in the last decade (Mexico, Thailand, Russia and Brazil). The country
faced a variety of economic and financial shocks during the 80s and 90s.
More recently, at the end of 2001, its banking system experienced a large de-
posit withdrawal, that was dealt with by imposing a suspension of convertibility
policy.
In order to understand this suspension measure implemented by the Ar-
gentine government it is important to present a summary of the economic and
regulatory environment and the structure of the financial system at that date.
It should be mentioned that the economic environment and the hyperinfla-
tion of 1989-90 destroyed the financial system (Calomiris and Powell, [2000])
and derived in a structural reforms plan that included banking regulation, pri-
vatization, financial liberalization and free international capital flows.
In this sense, although the Convertibility Law (Ley Convertibilidad3) helped
to recover the macroeconomic stability, it caused a strong appreciation of the
exchange rate, with the consequent loose of international competitiveness. This,
in turn, derived in a progressive deterioration of the model and the end of the
currency board.
By the end of 2001, the financial system had 108 financial institutions, which
managed loans and deposits for about 76.274 and 82.346 US million dollars re-
spectively. As a consequence of the Mexican crisis of 1994, the system evidenced
several changes, which caused an important concentration and internationaliza-
tion process,4 and the implementation of several intervention measures aiming
to stimulate its soundness and solvency.
A distinguishing feature of the financial system at the end of 2001 was the
high degree of dolarization, as 64 per cent of deposits and 70 per cent of loans
were denominated in US dollars. This particular feature and the asymmetric
treatment of assets and liabilities after the devaluation contributed to worsen
the negative effect on the financial institutions balance sheets.
Regarding deposit insurance, it was originally created in 1979, and elimi-
nated from the system in 1992. Three years later, in 1995, it was re-established.
This new system consisted on a fund privately managed by Sedesa S.A. (Seguro
3Law N23928 (March 1991), which settled the obligation of the Central Bank to exchange
pesos for dollars at one to one parity.
4As an indicator of concentration, it should be mentioned that in 2001 the five largest
financial institutions (in terms of assets) concentrated 48 per cent of total assets. On the
other hand, concerning the internationalization process, it is worth mentioning that foreign
financial institutions managed 48 per cent of loans and 52 per cent of total deposits.
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de los Depsitos S.A.5). At the end of 2001 the fund had an available balance of
about 270.88 US million dollars, equivalent to 0.4 per cent of total deposits of
the financial system.
In 2001 there was a strong and sustained withdrawal of deposits, which
worsened in the weeks previous to the suspension of convertibility policy. The
financial system lost 22 per cent of its total deposits. Several factors6 caused
these withdrawals, most of them related to the individual perception of an im-
minent end of the currency board7 and the consequent inability by the banks to
fulfill the dollar denominated liabilities. It should be mentioned that during this
period the insurance coverage was increased up to 30.000 US dollars. However,
due to the inability to stop the massive deposit withdrawal, the banking system
suspended convertibility of deposits into currency at the end of 2001.
3 Measures to prevent banking panics
To avoid the negative externalities and the high social cost related to banking
panics it is necessary to introduce regulatory measures that bring stability to
the financial system and protect depositors and investors. Examples of these
measures are suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance.
Concerning suspension of convertibility, it is an intervention measure that
was frequently used in the U.S. during the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies and consists on the banks refusal to exchange currency for demand de-
posits upon demand. Gorton [1985] points out that during this period convert-
ibility was suspended up to eight times in the US.
An interesting aspect is that, even though this measure implied a violation
of the deposit contract, neither depositors nor the banks were against it. It
was understood as a temporal measure to stop banking panics. During this
period, the bank tried to solve the liquidity problem and with the suspension,
depositors recovered the confidence in the system by recognizing the institutions
in trouble. Hence, by suspending convertibility, banks can signal to depositors
that continuation of investments is mutually beneficial.
Regarding deposit insurance, the rationale behind it, is the argument that
banks are inherently flawed institutions, being prone to banking panics. Con-
sequently, the government should provide deposit insurance and regulate bank
5See http://www.sedesa.com.ar
6The main factors were: the deep recession that started at the end of 1998, the high price
of foreign currencies in the future markets, the government’s difficult access to international
funding, the high lobbying pressures of the productive sector to abandon the fixed exchange
rate.
7Rigorously speaking, the Convertibility Law was not a fixed exchange rate regime, since
there was no obstacle to an appreciation of the peso with respect to the dollar. However, in
practice, it functioned as a currency board.
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risk taking.
The spread of government deposit insurance is a recent phenomenon8 and
a consequence of the widespread banking crisis suffered during the 80s and 90s
by several countries.
Although deposit insurance may avoid banking panics, giving stability to the
banking system, it also creates a moral hazard problem as banks have incentives
to invest in riskier assets and on the other side depositors’ incentives to monitor
their banks disappear as their deposits are insured (see Merton [1977]).
4 A welfare comparison
The purpose of this section is to present a welfare comparison between the two
above described measures: suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance.
To do so, we apply a model developed by Samartin [2002] to the recent Argentine
financial crisis, described in the previous section.9
4.1 Analytical framework
The model considers a three-period economy and one single commodity. On the
consumer side, there exist a continuum of ex-ante identical agents in the interval
[0,1] that are endowed with one unit of this consumption good in period 0. In
period 1, they are subject to a non-observable liquidity shock and they can be
either of two types. The difference between types is that type 1 agents10 derive
relatively more utility from consumption in period 1 with respect to type 2
agents. Individuals have power utility functions, with a constant relative risk
aversion coefficient denoted by γ.
It is assumed that a random fraction (α˜) of type 2 depositors receive a
perfectly informative signal about the bank’s asset return.11 This signal can be
interpreted as a relevant economic variable that affects the value of the bank
(in contrast to the CAPM this source of systematic risk is not known by all
agents). The rest of type 2 individuals do not acquire information and try to
infer the state of nature from the behaviour of the other agents.
8Gorton and Winton (2002) point out that two thirds of the deposit insurance programs
in the world have been established in the last fifteen years. See also Demirgc-Kunt and
Detragiache [2002] or Cardone [1998] for a description of insurance systems around the world
and Europe, respectively.
9For a detailed version of this model see Samartin [2002].
10Type 1 individuals have liquidity needs and the bank is able to insure them. The propor-
tion of this kind of individuals is random and takes a value t1 with probability r and t2 with
probability 1− r (and t1 < t2).
11This random variable may take a value α with probability q and 0 with probability 1− q.
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Finally, in period 0, the bank can invest in a technology that yields a random
return (R˜) in period 2.12 As mentioned before, this return is affected by an
exogenous risk factor.
The time structure of the model is summarized as follows: in period 1 in-
dividuals deposit their endowment in the bank, which has a comparative ad-
vantage in investing in the risky asset. In exchange, the financial intermediary
offers a contract that provides them with flexibility in order to adjust their
consumption pattern to their liquidity needs.
The withdrawal decision of type 1 consumers is trivial. As these agents
face liquidity needs at date 1, they will always choose to withdraw the money
from the bank. Among type 2 individuals, there is a fraction of them that has
acquired information about the banks asset. The model establishes conditions
such that their optimal decision is to withdraw the deposits when they receive a
negative signal and to maintain their funds otherwise. Finally, the rest of type
2 individuals are not informed and behave according to the size of the queue
that they observe at the bank, that is, they try to infer the state of nature
from the number of individuals that withdraw their deposits in the first period.
However, this size can be large enough due to both a negative information shock
(some type 2 individuals have received a bad signal) or to a liquidity shock (high
proportion of type 1 individuals). This noisy signal may induce the non informed
depositors to sometimes erroneously withdraw their funds from the bank.
Conditions for both information-induced and pure panic runs to occur are
summarized in theorem 1 of Samartin [2002].
Having established the characteristics of the equilibrium with banking pan-
ics, let us now assume that when individuals try to withdraw their deposits in
period 1, the bank announces a suspension of convertibility policy at the level of
the highest proportion of type 1 consumers. This suspension will be desirable in
good states or when there is no information; and on the contrary, it will generate
a cost in bad states or when some type 1 individuals do not receive the promised
consumption level (liquidity cost). The expected utility with suspension of con-
vertibility is compared with the one obtained with a deposit insurance system,
measure that is described below.
An alternative to suspension of convertibility is to have a deposit insurance
system. This insurance guarantees that whenever the bank fails (i.e., in those
states of nature in which the low return is realized) individuals will be covered
by the insurance fund. This mechanism is designed in order to give stability to
the banking system, since it removes the incentives of informed individuals to
acquire information and hence to run on the bank as they are always assured the
promised consumption level. However, the deposit insurance has a cost, that is,
whenever the low return is realized, other sectors have to supply the difference
12This random variable may take a value 0 < Rl < 1 with probability p and Rh > 1 with
probability 1− p.
6
(this is can be seen as a deadweight tax, and denoted by the variable λ).13 Since
λ is an exogenous variable, the results are presented as a function of a level of
λ∗, for which the two measures deliver the same utility. Hence, if the value of
the deadweight tax is λ∗ per cent or lower, the deposit insurance arrangement
is best. Otherwise, suspension of convertibility should be preferred.
Some of the conclusions obtained in Samartin [2002] are summarized in Fig-
ure 1. This figure shows the deadweight tax as a function of the relative risk
aversion coefficient (γ). As it can be observed, for low levels of this coeffi-
cient (values below a critical γ) suspension of convertibility is always best, even
though deposit insurance could be provided at zero cost. However, as risk aver-
sion increases (above the critical γ) deposit insurance improves with respect
to the suspension measure. As previously mentioned, if the deadweight tax
is λ∗ per cent or lower, the deposit insurance arrangement is best, otherwise
suspension of convertibility is more efficient.
Finally, it can be shown that this critical value is affected by other exoge-
nous parameters of the model, such as the bank’s asset expected return (R),
or its dispersion (σ2). Both, a decrease in the dispersion in the bank asset or
an increase in its expected return cause a higher value for the critical γ. Also
increasing the proportion of type 1 consumers reduces the critical value. Fi-
nally, variations in the proportion of informed agents, or its probability, do not
influence the critical γ.
4.2 Application to the case of Argentina
The main features of the recent Argentine crisis (i.e., a banking panic, the
implementation of a suspension of convertibility policy and the existence of a
deposit insurance system), allow us to apply the previously described model to
this particular case.
The application requires the estimation of two important parameters that
determine the choice of the most efficient policy measure: the deadweight tax
(λ) and the relative risk aversion coefficient (γ). Other relevant parameters in
the analysis are the expected return and the volatility of the bank’s asset.14
Those parameters have been estimated for the period April 1995 to Decem-
ber 2001 (the six previous years to the crisis). The main reasons for selecting
this period are the high sensitivity of the results to variations in the economic
environment and the fact that the main features of the financial system in De-
cember 2001 were a consequence of the changes experienced after the Mexican
crisis in 1994. Finally, the deposit insurance system was re-established in 1995.
13Using the Laffont and Tirole [1986] approach, it is assumed that a transfer C from the
regulatory agent to the bank will generate a social cost of (1 + λ)C.
14Concerning the rest of the parameters (proportions of each type of agents) we assume
reasonable values for them, presenting those that were used in Samart´ın [2002] simulations.
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Hereafter, the values for the most important parameters are estimated.
Regarding the relative risk aversion coefficient, it has been estimated with
a particular asset valuation model, like the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CCAPM) with a power utility function. The analysis approximates the
relative risk aversion coefficient using data relative to the market Sharpe Ratio
and the volatility of the consumption growth rate in a particular economy.15 As
already mentioned, this proxy assumes a power utility function, as the one used
in Samartin [2002] and can be written as:∣∣∣∣E(Rm)−Rfσ(Rm)
∣∣∣∣ =√eγ2σ2(∆ lnCt+1) − 1 ≈ γσ(∆ lnC) (1)
Where:
• R= Expected market return
• rf= Risk free asset return
• σ(RM )= Standard deviation of the market return
• γ= Relative risk aversion coefficient
• σ(lnC)= Volatility of the consumption growth rate
Hence, isolating the risk aversion coefficient in [1] it is obtained:
γ ≈
E(Rm)−Rf
σ(Rm)
σ(∆ lnC)
(2)
As mentioned above, the coefficient is approximated with data relative to
the expected market return and its volatility, the risk free rate and the volatility
of the consumption growth rate.
The proxy for the market return is the return on the Buenos Aires Stock
Exchange General Index (Indice General de la Bolsa de Buenos Aires -IGBBA-)
.16The choice of the risk free rate for Argentina, corresponds to the return on
U.S. Treasury Bills with maturity of one year. This choice is due to the lack
of a domestic asset that fulfils the required conditions and some features of the
Argentine economy in the analyzed period which allowed a wide access to the
international capital markets at a relative low cost. Among these particular
features were the fixed exchange rate established by the Convertibility Law
which derived in a dual currency economy, the lack of restrictions to the free
15For more details and a formal demonstration see Cochrane [2001].
16See Appendix A for a description of the data used in the analysis.
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international capital flows and the relative low transaction costs to change from
one currency to the other.
The average annual real return on the IGBBA for the analyzed period is 4.97
per cent with a standard deviation of about 33.38 per cent . Since the annual
real return on Treasury Bills has averaged 2.5 per cent, the market premium
is 2.48 per cent and the historical market Sharpe Ratio 0.074. The per capita
consumption growth rate has averaged 1.51 per cent with a standard deviation of
about 4.77 per cent. Hence, the relative risk aversion coefficient in the analyzed
period is 1.56.
It is worth mentioning that the market return series are affected by some
outlier values.17If those values are eliminated from the sample, the risk aversion
coefficient increases to 3.82, due to the higher Sharpe Ratio in absolute terms
(increases from 0.074 to 0.18). On the overall, the results obtained point out to
an approximate variation range: 1.56 < γ < 3.82.
The estimates of the relative risk aversion coefficient in the case of Argentina
are considered reasonable,18 and present some evidence against the equity pre-
mium puzzle observed in several markets like the American and the Spanish
ones,19 among others. The equity premium puzzle refers to the inability of the
basic asset valuation model with consumption to replicate market premiums
compatible with reasonable values of the relative risk aversion coefficient and
the observed volatility of the consumption growth rate. The main explanations
for this regularity are: a low consumption growth volatility, a high observed
market premium and a relative low volatility of the market return.
Concerning the bank’s asset expected return and volatility, they have been
approximated by the average and variance of returns for the consolidated bank-
ing system. In the period 1995-2001 banks averaged an annual return on assets
of about 0.12 per cent with a variance of returns of 4.16 per cent. These values
determine a critical gamma of 4.8 (see figure 2). The estimation of the relative
risk aversion coefficient described above ranges from 1.56 to 3.82. Therefore, the
model suggests that the suspension measure implemented was the most efficient
one.
Finally, with respect to the deadweight tax, as can be seen in figure 2,
suspension of convertibility turns out to be the preferred policy, independent
on the value of the deadweight tax (even if deposit insurance could have been
provided at zero cost). As already mentioned in section 2 the insurance system
17Those outlier values were due to the economic stability and the fast development of
the capital market generated by the structural reforms implemented: transition to an open
economy, privatization of state companies and the pension system, free international capital
flows, etc.
18See Cochrane [2001] and Gollier[2001] for discussions concerning reasonable values of the
coefficient.
19For a description of the equity premium puzzle in those markets see Cochrane[2001] and
Marin and Rubio [2000].
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had funds for equivalent 0.4 per cent of total deposits of the financial system,
which implies that a transfer of resources from the regulatory agent to the banks
would have needed, in this second alternative.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper attempts to empirically apply the model developed by Samartin
[2002], to the particular case of Argentina. This model presents a welfare com-
parison between two traditional measures to prevent banking panics: suspension
of convertibility and deposit insurance.
The features of the recent Argentine crisis (i.e., a general banking panic, the
implementation of a suspension of convertibility policy and the existence of a
deposit insurance system) constitute an interesting scenario in order to apply
the above mentioned model.
Samartin [2002] predicts that suspension of convertibility should be the pre-
ferred measure to cope with panics for values of the relative risk aversion coeffi-
cient (γ) below a critical one. If γ is greater than this critical one, then deposit
insurance turns out to be a better policy as long as the deadweight tax is not
too high (below λ∗). The estimation of the relative risk aversion coefficient in
the case of Argentina is 1.56 < γ < 3.82, and the estimation of the critical γ is
4.8. These results imply that the suspension measure implemented turned out
to be the most efficient tool, even if deposit insurance could have been provided
at zero cost.
Finally, in a general context, this work questions the assumed stability at-
tributed to deposit insurance systems, which justify their existence in the bank-
ing systems in spite of their implied costs. In this sense, the Argentine crisis
has demonstrated that deposit insurance had not been an efficient tool -at least
in this case- to prevent banking panics, which open again the debate about
the reforms needed in deposit insurance systems (see Calomiris [1999] or Boyd,
Chang and Smith, [2002]), or whether insurance is desirable in all countries,
independently of the degree of development of the financial system.
This debate is also of interest in the face of recent regulatory changes, as
the New Basel II capital Accord, which will obviously affect the design and
regulation of financial systems. It might also be worth re-examining deposit
insurance in the light of these changes.
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A Data description
• Per capita consumption growth rate: annualized growth rate of the quar-
terly series of private non seasonal consumption obtained from National
Accounts published by Instituto Nacional de Estad´ısticas y Censos de Ar-
gentina [INDEC]. The population data are also estimates of the INDEC.
• Market return: annualized real return on the monthly series of the Indice
General de la Bolsa de Buenos Aires.
• Risk free rate: annualized real return on Treasury Bills (monthly series)
with maturity one year published by the U. S Federal Reserve.
• Expected return and volatility of the bank’s asset: average return on
assets (ROA) and variance of returns estimated from monthly data from
the consolidated balance sheet of the financial system (Banco Central de
la Repblica Argentina).
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